gvisor/pkg/abi/BUILD

load("//tools:defs.bzl", "go_library")

package(licenses = ["notice"])

go_library(
    name = "abi",
    srcs = [
        "abi.go",
        "abi_linux.go",
        "flag.go",
    ],
    visibility = ["//:sandbox"],
)
Standardize on tools directory. PiperOrigin-RevId: 291745021 2020-01-27 18:04:07 +00:00			`load("//tools:defs.bzl", "go_library")`
Check in gVisor. PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126 Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463 2018-04-27 17:37:02 +00:00
Reorder BUILD license and load functions in gvisor. PiperOrigin-RevId: 275139066 2019-10-16 23:27:55 +00:00			`package(licenses = ["notice"])`

Check in gVisor. PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126 Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463 2018-04-27 17:37:02 +00:00			`go_library(`
			`name = "abi",`
			`srcs = [`
			`"abi.go",`
Add seccomp filter configuration to ptrace stubs. This is a defense-in-depth measure. If the sentry is compromised, this prevents system call injection to the stubs. There is some complexity with respect to ptrace and seccomp interactions, so this protection is not really available for kernel versions < 4.8; this is detected dynamically. Note that this also solves the vsyscall emulation issue by adding in appropriate trapping for those system calls. It does mean that a compromised sentry could theoretically inject these into the stub (ignoring the trap and resume, thereby allowing execution), but they are harmless. PiperOrigin-RevId: 216647581 Change-Id: Id06c232cbac1f9489b1803ec97f83097fcba8eb8 2018-10-11 05:39:32 +00:00			`"abi_linux.go",`
Check in gVisor. PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126 Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463 2018-04-27 17:37:02 +00:00			`"flag.go",`
			`],`
			`visibility = ["//:sandbox"],`
			`)`