seccomp: introduce the GreaterThan rule type

PiperOrigin-RevId: 280075805
This commit is contained in:
Andrei Vagin 2019-11-12 15:58:41 -08:00 committed by gVisor bot
parent 3f51bef8cd
commit ca9cba66d2
3 changed files with 68 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -199,6 +199,10 @@ func ruleViolationLabel(ruleSetIdx int, sysno uintptr, idx int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("ruleViolation_%v_%v_%v", ruleSetIdx, sysno, idx)
}
func ruleLabel(ruleSetIdx int, sysno uintptr, idx int, name string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("rule_%v_%v_%v_%v", ruleSetIdx, sysno, idx, name)
}
func checkArgsLabel(sysno uintptr) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("checkArgs_%v", sysno)
}
@ -223,6 +227,19 @@ func addSyscallArgsCheck(p *bpf.ProgramBuilder, rules []Rule, action linux.BPFAc
p.AddStmt(bpf.Ld|bpf.Abs|bpf.W, seccompDataOffsetArgHigh(i))
p.AddJumpFalseLabel(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jeq|bpf.K, high, 0, ruleViolationLabel(ruleSetIdx, sysno, ruleidx))
labelled = true
case GreaterThan:
labelGood := fmt.Sprintf("gt%v", i)
high, low := uint32(a>>32), uint32(a)
// assert arg_high < high
p.AddStmt(bpf.Ld|bpf.Abs|bpf.W, seccompDataOffsetArgHigh(i))
p.AddJumpFalseLabel(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jge|bpf.K, high, 0, ruleViolationLabel(ruleSetIdx, sysno, ruleidx))
// arg_high > high
p.AddJumpFalseLabel(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jeq|bpf.K, high, 0, ruleLabel(ruleSetIdx, sysno, ruleidx, labelGood))
// arg_low < low
p.AddStmt(bpf.Ld|bpf.Abs|bpf.W, seccompDataOffsetArgLow(i))
p.AddJumpFalseLabel(bpf.Jmp|bpf.Jgt|bpf.K, low, 0, ruleViolationLabel(ruleSetIdx, sysno, ruleidx))
p.AddLabel(ruleLabel(ruleSetIdx, sysno, ruleidx, labelGood))
labelled = true
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unknown syscall rule type: %v", reflect.TypeOf(a))
}

View File

@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ func (a AllowAny) String() (s string) {
// AllowValue specifies a value that needs to be strictly matched.
type AllowValue uintptr
// GreaterThan specifies a value that needs to be strictly smaller.
type GreaterThan uintptr
func (a AllowValue) String() (s string) {
return fmt.Sprintf("%#x ", uintptr(a))
}

View File

@ -340,6 +340,54 @@ func TestBasic(t *testing.T) {
},
},
},
{
ruleSets: []RuleSet{
{
Rules: SyscallRules{
1: []Rule{
{
GreaterThan(0xf),
GreaterThan(0xabcd000d),
},
},
},
Action: linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW,
},
},
defaultAction: linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
specs: []spec{
{
desc: "GreaterThan: Syscall argument allowed",
data: seccompData{nr: 1, arch: linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, args: [6]uint64{0x10, 0xffffffff}},
want: linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW,
},
{
desc: "GreaterThan: Syscall argument disallowed (equal)",
data: seccompData{nr: 1, arch: linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, args: [6]uint64{0xf, 0xffffffff}},
want: linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
},
{
desc: "Syscall argument disallowed (smaller)",
data: seccompData{nr: 1, arch: linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, args: [6]uint64{0x0, 0xffffffff}},
want: linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
},
{
desc: "GreaterThan2: Syscall argument allowed",
data: seccompData{nr: 1, arch: linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, args: [6]uint64{0x10, 0xfbcd000d}},
want: linux.SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW,
},
{
desc: "GreaterThan2: Syscall argument disallowed (equal)",
data: seccompData{nr: 1, arch: linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, args: [6]uint64{0x10, 0xabcd000d}},
want: linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
},
{
desc: "GreaterThan2: Syscall argument disallowed (smaller)",
data: seccompData{nr: 1, arch: linux.AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, args: [6]uint64{0x10, 0xa000ffff}},
want: linux.SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
},
},
},
} {
instrs, err := BuildProgram(test.ruleSets, test.defaultAction)
if err != nil {