Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ian Gudger 8fce67af24 Use correct company name in copyright header
PiperOrigin-RevId: 217951017
Change-Id: Ie08bf6987f98467d07457bcf35b5f1ff6e43c035
2018-10-19 16:35:11 -07:00
Adin Scannell 463e73d46d Add seccomp filter configuration to ptrace stubs.
This is a defense-in-depth measure. If the sentry is compromised, this prevents
system call injection to the stubs. There is some complexity with respect to
ptrace and seccomp interactions, so this protection is not really available
for kernel versions < 4.8; this is detected dynamically.

Note that this also solves the vsyscall emulation issue by adding in
appropriate trapping for those system calls. It does mean that a compromised
sentry could theoretically inject these into the stub (ignoring the trap and
resume, thereby allowing execution), but they are harmless.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 216647581
Change-Id: Id06c232cbac1f9489b1803ec97f83097fcba8eb8
2018-10-10 22:40:28 -07:00
Adin Scannell 29e00c943a Add CPUID faulting for ptrace and KVM.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 204858314
Change-Id: I8252bf8de3232a7a27af51076139b585e73276d4
2018-07-16 22:02:58 -07:00
Adin Scannell dc33d71f8c Change SIGCHLD to SIGKILL in ptrace stubs.
If the child stubs are killed by any unmaskable signal (e.g. SIGKILL), then
the parent process will similarly be killed, resulting in the death of all
other stubs.

The effect of this is that if the OOM killer selects and kills a stub, the
effect is the same as though the OOM killer selected and killed the sentry.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 202219984
Change-Id: I0b638ce7e59e0a0f4d5cde12a7d05242673049d7
2018-06-26 16:54:44 -07:00
Googler d02b74a5dc Check in gVisor.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 194583126
Change-Id: Ica1d8821a90f74e7e745962d71801c598c652463
2018-04-28 01:44:26 -04:00