This makes `runsc wait` behave more like waitpid()/wait4() in that:
- Once a process has run to completion, you can wait on it and get its exit
code.
- Processes not waited on will consume memory (like a zombie process)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213358916
Change-Id: I5b5eca41ce71eea68e447380df8c38361a4d1558
This was previously broken in 212917409, resulting in "missing function body"
compilation errors.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213323695
Change-Id: I32a95b76a1c73fd731f223062ec022318b979bd4
runApp.execute -> Task.SendSignal -> sendSignalLocked -> sendSignalTimerLocked
-> pendingSignals.enqueue assumes that it owns the arch.SignalInfo returned
from platform.Context.Switch.
On the other hand, ptrace.context.Switch assumes that it owns the returned
SignalInfo and can safely reuse it on the next call to Switch. The KVM platform
always returns a unique SignalInfo.
This becomes a problem when the returned signal is not immediately delivered,
allowing a future signal in Switch to change the previous pending SignalInfo.
This is noticeable in #38 when external SIGINTs are delivered from the PTY
slave FD. Note that the ptrace stubs are in the same process group as the
sentry, so they are eligible to receive the PTY signals. This should probably
change, but is not the only possible cause of this bug.
Updates #38
Original change by newmanwang <wcs1011@gmail.com>, updated by Michael Pratt
<mpratt@google.com>.
Change-Id: I5383840272309df70a29f67b25e8221f933622cd
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213071072
Linux permits hard-linking if the target is owned by the user OR the target has
Read+Write permission.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 213024613
Change-Id: If642066317b568b99084edd33ee4e8822ec9cbb3
The old kernel version, such as 4.4, only support 255 vcpus.
While gvisor is ran on these kernels, it could panic because the
vcpu id and vcpu number beyond max_vcpus.
Use ioctl(vmfd, _KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, _KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS) to get max
vcpus number dynamically.
Change-Id: I50dd859a11b1c2cea854a8e27d4bf11a411aa45c
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212929704
Netstack needs to be portable, so this seems to be preferable to using raw
system calls.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212917409
Change-Id: I7b2073e7db4b4bf75300717ca23aea4c15be944c
This CL:
1) Fix `runsc wait`, it now also works after the container exits;
2) Generate correct container state in Load;
2) Make sure `Destory` cleanup everything before successfully return.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212900107
Change-Id: Ie129cbb9d74f8151a18364f1fc0b2603eac4109a
The contract in ExecArgs says that a reference on ExecArgs.Root must be held
for the lifetime of the struct, but the caller is free to drop the ref after
that.
As a result, proc.Exec must take an additional ref on Root when it constructs
the CreateProcessArgs, since that holds a pointer to Root as well. That ref is
dropped in CreateProcess.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212828348
Change-Id: I7f44a612f337ff51a02b873b8a845d3119408707
This is different from the existing -pid-file flag, which saves a host pid.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212713968
Change-Id: I2c486de8dd5cfd9b923fb0970165ef7c5fc597f0
We were previously openining the platform device (i.e. /dev/kvm) inside the
platfrom constructor (i.e. kvm.New). This requires that we have RW access to
the platform device when constructing the platform.
However, now that the runsc sandbox process runs as user "nobody", it is not
able to open the platform device.
This CL changes the kvm constructor to take the platform device FD, rather than
opening the device file itself. The device file is opened outside of the
sandbox and passed to the sandbox process.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212505804
Change-Id: I427e1d9de5eb84c84f19d513356e1bb148a52910
Inside the chroot, we run as user nobody, so all mounted files and directories
must be accessible to all users.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212284805
Change-Id: I705e0dbbf15e01e04e0c7f378a99daffe6866807
We must use a context.Context with a Root Dirent that corresponds to the
container's chroot. Previously we were using the root context, which does not
have a chroot.
Getting the correct context required refactoring some of the path-lookup code.
We can't lookup the path without a context.Context, which requires
kernel.CreateProcArgs, which we only get inside control.Execute. So we have to
do the path lookup much later than we previously were.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212064734
Change-Id: I84a5cfadacb21fd9c3ab9c393f7e308a40b9b537
This allows applications to verify they are running with gVisor. It
also helps debugging when running with a mix of container runtimes.
Closes#54
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212059457
Change-Id: I51d9595ee742b58c1f83f3902ab2e2ecbd5cedec
It was used before gofer was implemented and it's not
supported anymore.
BREAKING CHANGE: proxy-shared and proxy-exclusive options
are now: shared and exclusive.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 212017643
Change-Id: If029d4073fe60583e5ca25f98abb2953de0d78fd
Before destroying the Kernel, we disable signal forwarding,
relinquishing control to the Go runtime. External signals that arrive
after disabling forwarding but before the sandbox exits thus may use
runtime.raise (i.e., tkill(2)) and violate the syscall filters.
Adjust forwardSignals to handle signals received after disabling
forwarding the same way they are handled before starting forwarding.
i.e., by implementing the standard Go runtime behavior using tgkill(2)
instead of tkill(2).
This also makes the stop callback block until forwarding actually stops.
This isn't required to avoid tkill(2) but is a saner interface.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211995946
Change-Id: I3585841644409260eec23435cf65681ad41f5f03
We construct a dir with the executable bind-mounted at /exe, and proc mounted
at /proc. Runsc now executes the sandbox process inside this chroot, thus
limiting access to the host filesystem. The mounts and chroot dir are removed
when the sandbox is destroyed.
Because this requires bind-mounts, we can only do the chroot if we have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211994001
Change-Id: Ia71c515e26085e0b69b833e71691830148bc70d1