Migrates all (except 3) seqfile implementations to the vfs.DynamicBytesSource
interface. There should not be any change in functionality due to this migration
itself.
Please note that the following seqfile implementations have not been migrated:
- /proc/filesystems in proc/filesystems.go
- /proc/[pid]/mountinfo in proc/mounts.go
- /proc/[pid]/mounts in proc/mounts.go
This is because these depend on pending changes in /pkg/senty/vfs.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 263880719
Addresses obvious typos, in the documentation only.
COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/google/gvisor/pull/443 from Pixep:fix/documentation-spelling 4d0688164eafaf0b3010e5f4824b35d1e7176d65
PiperOrigin-RevId: 255477779
We still only advertise a single NUMA node, and ignore mempolicy
accordingly, but mbind() at least now succeeds and has effects reflected
by get_mempolicy().
Also fix handling of nodemasks: round sizes to unsigned long (as
documented and done by Linux), and zero trailing bits when copying them
out.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 251950859
We don't actually support core dumps, but some applications want to
get/set dumpability, which still has an effect in procfs.
Lack of support for set-uid binaries or fs creds simplifies things a
bit.
As-is, processes started via CreateProcess (i.e., init and sentryctl
exec) have normal dumpability. I'm a bit torn on whether sentryctl exec
tasks should be dumpable, but at least since they have no parent normal
UID/GID checks should protect them.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 251712714
VmData is the size of private data segments.
It has the same meaning as in Linux.
Change-Id: Iebf1ae85940a810524a6cde9c2e767d4233ddb2a
PiperOrigin-RevId: 250593739
Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.
1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.
Fixes#209
PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212
Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
We call NewSharedAnonMappable simply to use it for Mappable/MappingIdentity for
shared anon mmap. From MMapOpts.MappingIdentity: "If MMapOpts is used to
successfully create a memory mapping, a reference is taken on MappingIdentity."
mm.createVMALocked (below) takes this additional reference, so we don't need
the reference returned by NewSharedAnonMappable. Holding it leaks the mappable.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 241038108
Change-Id: I78ee3af78e0cc7aac4063b274b30d0e41eb5677d
MM.insertPMAsLocked() passes vma.maxPerms to memmap.Mappable.Translate
(although it unsets AccessType.Write if the vma is private). This
somewhat simplifies handling of pmas, since it means only COW-break
needs to replace existing pmas. However, it also means that a MAP_SHARED
mapping of a file opened O_RDWR dirties the file, regardless of the
mapping's permissions and whether or not the mapping is ever actually
written to with I/O that ignores permissions (e.g.
ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA)).
To fix this:
- Change the pma-getting path to request only the permissions that are
required for the calling access.
- Change memmap.Mappable.Translate to take requested permissions, and
return allowed permissions. This preserves the existing behavior in the
common cases where the memmap.Mappable isn't
fsutil.CachingInodeOperations and doesn't care if the translated
platform.File pages are written to.
- Change the MM.getPMAsLocked path to support permission upgrading of
pmas outside of copy-on-write.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 240196979
Change-Id: Ie0147c62c1fbc409467a6fa16269a413f3d7d571
This is in preparation for improved page cache reclaim, which requires
greater integration between the page cache and page allocator.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 238444706
Change-Id: Id24141b3678d96c7d7dc24baddd9be555bffafe4
- Redefine some memmap.Mappable, platform.File, and platform.Memory
semantics in terms of File reference counts (no functional change).
- Make AddressSpace.MapFile take a platform.File instead of a raw FD,
and replace platform.File.MapInto with platform.File.FD. This allows
kvm.AddressSpace.MapFile to always use platform.File.MapInternal instead
of maintaining its own (redundant) cache of file mappings in the sentry
address space.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 238044504
Change-Id: Ib73a11e4275c0da0126d0194aa6c6017a9cef64f
It is Implemented without the priority inheritance part given
that gVisor defers scheduling decisions to Go runtime and doesn't
have control over it.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 236989545
Change-Id: I714c8ca0798743ecf3167b14ffeb5cd834302560
Nothing reads them and they can simply get stale.
Generated with:
$ sed -i "s/licenses(\(.*\)).*/licenses(\1)/" **/BUILD
PiperOrigin-RevId: 231818945
Change-Id: Ibc3f9838546b7e94f13f217060d31f4ada9d4bf0
Currently mlock() and friends do nothing whatsoever. However, mlocking
is directly application-visible in a number of ways; for example,
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) and msync(MS_INVALIDATE) both fail on mlocked
regions. We handle this inconsistently: MADV_DONTNEED is too important
to not work, but MS_INVALIDATE is rejected.
Change MM to track mlocked regions in a manner consistent with Linux.
It still will not actually pin pages into host physical memory, but:
- mlock() will now cause sentry memory management to precommit mlocked
pages.
- MADV_DONTNEED and MS_INVALIDATE will interact with mlocked pages as
described above.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 225861605
Change-Id: Iee187204979ac9a4d15d0e037c152c0902c8d0ee
Also update test utilities for probing vsyscall support and add a
metric to see if vsyscalls are actually used in sandboxes.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 221698834
Change-Id: I57870ecc33ea8c864bd7437833f21aa1e8117477
- Shared futex objects on shared mappings are represented by Mappable +
offset, analogous to Linux's use of inode + offset. Add type
futex.Key, and change the futex.Manager bucket API to use futex.Keys
instead of addresses.
- Extend the futex.Checker interface to be able to return Keys for
memory mappings. It returns Keys rather than just mappings because
whether the address or the target of the mapping is used in the Key
depends on whether the mapping is MAP_SHARED or MAP_PRIVATE; this
matters because using mapping target for a futex on a MAP_PRIVATE
mapping causes it to stop working across COW-breaking.
- futex.Manager.WaitComplete depends on atomic updates to
futex.Waiter.addr to determine when it has locked the right bucket,
which is much less straightforward for struct futex.Waiter.key. Switch
to an atomically-accessed futex.Waiter.bucket pointer.
- futex.Manager.Wake now needs to take a futex.Checker to resolve
addresses for shared futexes. CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID requires the exit
path to perform a shared futex wakeup (Linux:
kernel/fork.c:mm_release() => sys_futex(tsk->clear_child_tid,
FUTEX_WAKE, ...)). This is a problem because futexChecker is in the
syscalls/linux package. Move it to kernel.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216207039
Change-Id: I708d68e2d1f47e526d9afd95e7fed410c84afccf
Furthermore, allow for the specification of an ElementMapper. This allows a
single "Element" type to exist on multiple inline lists, and work without
having to embed the entry type.
This is a requisite change for supporting a per-Inode list of Dirents.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 211467497
Change-Id: If2768999b43e03fdaecf8ed15f435fe37518d163
We have been unnecessarily creating too many savable types implicitly.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 206334201
Change-Id: Idc5a3a14bfb7ee125c4f2bb2b1c53164e46f29a8
CheckIORange is analagous to Linux's access_ok() method, which is checked when
copying in IOVecs in both lib/iov_iter.c:import_single_range() and
lib/iov_iter.c:import_iovec() => fs/read_write.c:rw_copy_check_uvector().
gVisor copies in IOVecs via Task.SingleIOSequence() and Task.CopyInIovecs().
We were checking the address range bounds, but not whether the address is
valid. To conform with linux, we should also check that the address is valid.
For usual preadv/pwritev syscalls, the effect of this change is not noticeable,
since we find out that the address is invalid before the syscall completes.
For vectorized async-IO operations, however, this change is necessary because
Linux returns EFAULT when the operation is submitted, but before it executes.
Thus, we must validate the iovecs when copying them in.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 202370092
Change-Id: I8759a63ccf7e6b90d90d30f78ab8935a0fcf4936