Before https://golang.org/cl/173160 syscall.RawSyscall would zero out
the last three register arguments to the system call. That no longer happens.
For system calls that take more than three arguments, use RawSyscall6 to
ensure that we pass zero, not random data, for the additional arguments.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 271062527
Addresses obvious typos, in the documentation only.
COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/google/gvisor/pull/443 from Pixep:fix/documentation-spelling 4d0688164eafaf0b3010e5f4824b35d1e7176d65
PiperOrigin-RevId: 255477779
The tracee is stopped early during process exit, when registers are still
available, allowing the tracer to see where the exit occurred, whereas the
normal exit notifi? cation is done after the process is finished exiting.
Without this option, dumpAndPanic fails to get registers.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 254852917
Based on the guidelines at
https://opensource.google.com/docs/releasing/authors/.
1. $ rg -l "Google LLC" | xargs sed -i 's/Google LLC.*/The gVisor Authors./'
2. Manual fixup of "Google Inc" references.
3. Add AUTHORS file. Authors may request to be added to this file.
4. Point netstack AUTHORS to gVisor AUTHORS. Drop CONTRIBUTORS.
Fixes#209
PiperOrigin-RevId: 245823212
Change-Id: I64530b24ad021a7d683137459cafc510f5ee1de9
- Redefine some memmap.Mappable, platform.File, and platform.Memory
semantics in terms of File reference counts (no functional change).
- Make AddressSpace.MapFile take a platform.File instead of a raw FD,
and replace platform.File.MapInto with platform.File.FD. This allows
kvm.AddressSpace.MapFile to always use platform.File.MapInternal instead
of maintaining its own (redundant) cache of file mappings in the sentry
address space.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 238044504
Change-Id: Ib73a11e4275c0da0126d0194aa6c6017a9cef64f
arch_prctl already verified that the new FS_BASE was canonical, but
Task.Clone did not. Centralize these checks in the arch packages.
Failure to validate could cause an error in PTRACE_SET_REGS when we try
to switch to the app.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 224862398
Change-Id: Iefe63b3f9aa6c4810326b8936e501be3ec407f14
This is a defense-in-depth measure. If the sentry is compromised, this prevents
system call injection to the stubs. There is some complexity with respect to
ptrace and seccomp interactions, so this protection is not really available
for kernel versions < 4.8; this is detected dynamically.
Note that this also solves the vsyscall emulation issue by adding in
appropriate trapping for those system calls. It does mean that a compromised
sentry could theoretically inject these into the stub (ignoring the trap and
resume, thereby allowing execution), but they are harmless.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 216647581
Change-Id: Id06c232cbac1f9489b1803ec97f83097fcba8eb8